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THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LANDLORD'S
RIGHTS TO RECEIVE POST-PETITION RENTAL
PAYMENTS UNDER SECTION 365(d)(3) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
C. Alan Gauldin*
I. INTRODUCTION
A bankruptcy trustee1 has sixty days after bankruptcy is filed to
determine whether to assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresi-
dential real property.2 The court has authority to grant the trustee an
extension of time to make this election, but unless the trustee takes
steps to assume or reject the lease prior to the deadline, the lease is
automatically rejected upon expiration of this period. 3
Prior to assumption or rejection, the trustee can continue to hold
the real property and the landlord must wait to see what the trustee
does with the lease." Before 1984, the trustee could hold the property
during this waiting period without paying rent or other charges due
under the contract.5 If the landlord wanted to receive rent, he had to
request payment as an administrative claim, which was usually mea-
sured by the fair market value of the estate's actual benefit from or use
* Associate, Pettus Law Firm, Fayetteville, Arkansas. B.A., 1985, The University of Utah;
J.D., 1988, The University of Arkansas School of Law. Special thanks to Kerri L. McDaniel for
her preparation of the manuscript.
1. For purposes of this article, the term "trustee" also applies to a debtor in possession
under II U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1203 (1988).
2. See the text of II U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (1988), infra note 18.
3. Id. Courts are divided on whether the trustee must actually obtain an order or simply
make application during the grace period. See In re Tandem Group, Inc., 60 B.R. 125, 126-27
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) and cases cited.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (d)(4) (1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1983) (amended 1984) stated:
(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject
an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order
for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day
period, fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor at any time before the
confirmation of a plan, but the court, on request of any party to such contract or lease,
may order the trustee to determine within a specified period of time whether to assume
or reject such contract or lease.
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of the property, and would be paid, if at all, with other such claims.6
To rectify this situation, Congress passed the so-called "Shopping
Center Amendments" to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.7 These
amendments added to the Code provisions that required the trustee to
honor the debtor's lease obligations during the time between filing and
assumption or rejection'
Even prior to these amendments, the trustee had to cure defaults if
he wished to assume the lease, so the landlord would ultimately receive
payment in case of assumption.9 This did not change under the amend-
ments. 10 Under current practice, however, when the trustee ultimately
rejects the lease, either by court order or expiration of the waiting pe-
riod, and also fails to pay the rent due during this period, the landlord
has to seek payment of an administrative claim under the applicable
provisions of the code."
6. II U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (1988); Memphis-Shelby County Airport Auth. v. Braniff
Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 783 F.2d (1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Attorneys
Office Management, Inc., 29 B.R. 96, 98-99 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983). Some courts held the extent
of the debtor's use of the property should not be considered in determining the amount of the
claim. In re Fred Sanders Co., 22 B.R. 902 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982). The lease amount was
presumed to be the reasonable rate. Braniff, 783 F.2d at 1285; Fred Sanders Co., 22 B.R. at 907.
Administrative claims are entitled to priority payment under I I U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1988). Prior
to 1984, nothing entitled such a claim to any priority over other administrative claims.
7. Great Western Savings Bank v. Orvco, Inc. (In re Orvco, Inc.), 95 B.R. 724, 726-27
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re Tammey Jewels, Inc., 116 B.R. 292, 294 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990);
In re O.P. Held, Inc., 77 B.R. 388, 389-90 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re M.H.I., Inc., 61 B.R.
69, 70 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (1988). Although these provisions were intended to specifically
benefit the shopping center industry, they are not limited to that industry and apply generally to
all commercial leases. Orvco, 95 B.R. at 720.
9. I1 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1983) (amended 1984) stated:
(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assump-
tion of such contract or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure, such
default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly com-
pensate, a party other than the debtor to such a contract or lease, from any actual
pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
10. I1 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); In re Westview 74th St. Drug Corp., 59
B.R. 747, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Tandem Group, Inc., 60 B.R. 125, 127 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1986).
1I. See generally the cases cited infra notes 23 to 63, which all involve situations where the
trustee has not paid the rent and which were all decided on "administrative claim" grounds. The
statute actually says nothing about according the unpaid rent claims administrative expense sta-
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When the landlord does so, trustees have defended on many
grounds, raising primarily these two issues:
(1) What is the proper amount of the landlord's claim; the contract
amount or the fair market value of the estate's actual benefit from the
use of the premises?
(2) Should the rent be paid immediately, ahead of other administra-
tive claims, or must the landlord wait to be paid along with other
administrative claimants?"
This article will not discuss the wisdom or policy concerns behind
the relevant Congressional Acts,' 3 but will specifically address the pur-
ported congressional intent, the statutory language, the courts' imple-
mentation of these policies, and what action may be necessary to clear
up confusion and promote uniformity among the jurisdictions.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
After adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, and prior to the
1984 amendments, a bankruptcy trustee could wait at least sixty days
to determine to accept or reject a lease of real property, regardless of
whether it was residential or commercial." During that time, even if
the debtor was not actually using the property, the landlord had no real
recourse to require the trustee to pay rent other than to seek payment
of an administrative claim. 15
This situation apparently caused particular problems for the shop-
tus. On this issue, see the discussion infra note 68.
12. See generally the cases cited infra notes 24 to 63.
13. For purposes of this discussion, the author takes the position invoked by Judge Louise
DeCarl Malugen of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California:
Apparently, a legislative decision has been made to sacrifice the potential for realizing
on certain assets of the estate for the benefit of all creditors so as to minimize the
potential for harm which might be caused by delay in payment to only one class of
creditors-landlords. This is a judgment within the province of the legislature to make
and not within the province of the court to change no matter how deleterious the effect
may be on maximizing recovery in liquidation proceedings. After all, it may be argued
that the time limitations imposed by section 365(d)(3) only spread to all creditors that
burden which was previously borne only by the landlord.
In re Galvan, 57 B.R. 732, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986). For a discussion of the policy considera-
tions behind the adoption of the "Shopping Center Amendments," see Diane Banks, Note, Section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code: Out of Balance After 1984?, 1986 UTAH L REV. 781 (1986).
14. II U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1983) gave the trustee 60 days in a chapter 7 liquidation. Under
subparagraph (2), the trustee in a chapter 9, 11, or 13 proceeding could wait until "any time
before the confirmation of a plan." See supra note 5 for the text of these provisions prior to the
1984 amendments.
15. See generally Banks, Note supra note 13 and cases cited supra note 6.
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ping center industry, which successfully lobbied Congress for adoption
of the so-called "Shopping Center Amendments," or additional provi-
sions requiring trustees to continue to honor the debtor's nonresidential
lease obligations during this period.16 To justify these amendments, the
congressional record reflects the following reasoning:
This subtitle contains three major substantive provisions which
are intended to remedy serious problems caused shopping centers and
their solvent tenants by the administration of the bankruptcy code.
[The second] problem is that during the time the debtor has va-
cated space but has not yet decided whether to assume or reject the
lease, the trustee has stopped making payments due under the lease.
These payments include rent due the landlord and common area
charges which are paid by all the tenants according to the amount of
space they lease. In this situation, the landlord is forced to provide
current services-the use of its property, utilities, security, and other
services-without current payment. No other creditor is put in this
position. In addition, the other tenants often must increase their com-
mon area charge payments to compensate for the trustee's failure to
make the required payments for the debtor. The bill would lessen
these problems by requiring the trustee to perform all the obligations
of the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real property at the time
required in the lease. This timely performance requirement will insure
that debtor-tenants pay their rent, common area, and other charges
on time pending the trustee's assumption or rejection of the lease. 7
To promote these policies, Congress revised 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1)
and (2) to apply to residential real property, and added subparagraphs
(3) and (4).18 Subparagraph (3) states:
16. See generally Banks, Note supra note 13 and cases cited supra note 7.
17. 130 CONG. REC. S8894-95 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch), quoted
in In re Longua, 58 B.R. 503, 505 n.l (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986).
18. Compare the text of section 365(d) prior to the amendments, as set forth supra note 5,
with the current language of the provision, which is as follows:
(d)(1) In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of per-
sonal property of the debtor within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such
additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such con-
tract or lease is deemed rejected.
(2) In a case under chapter 9, 1I, 12, or 13 of this title, the trustee may assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of per-
sonal property of the debtor at any time before the confirmation of a plan but the court,
on the request of any party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to deter-
mine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract or
[Vol. 14:491
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The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . .
arising from or after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected,
notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title.
Congress apparently intended the trustee to pay this rent, but the
statute has not always had this effect, at least not in a substantial num-
ber of reported cases. Instead of paying rent during the initial period,
the trustee often retains the property, makes no effort to pay rent or
other charges, waits as long as possible to avoid having to make the
election, and then allows the lease to be rejected by operation of law,
having used the property for at least two and up to any number of
months without paying any rent. 19
III. ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Interpretations of the Statute Itself and of the Intent of
Congress
1. The Amount of Rent to be Paid-Contract Rate vs. Fair
Market Value of the Debtor's Actual Use
Prior to the adoption of Section 365(d)(3), the lessor of nonresi-
dential real property was relegated to seeking rent payments as admin-
istrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), which accords ad-
ministrative expense status to "the actual, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate." Before 1984, most courts interpreted this pro-
lease.
(3) The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those
specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any
unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected,
notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. The court may extend, for cause, the
time for performance of any such obligation that arises within 60 days after the date of
the order for relief, but the time for performance shall not be extended beyond such 60-
day period. This subsection shall not be deemed to affect the trustee's obligations under
the provisions of subsection (b) or (f) of this section. Acceptance of any such perform-
ance does not constitute waiver or relinquishment of the lessor's rights under such lease
or under this title.
(4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of this
title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real
property under which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days after the date of the order
for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day
period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately sur-
render such nonresidential real property to the lessor.
19. See generally infra notes 24 to 63, the cases cited, and accompanying text.
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vision to entitle the landlord to receive the fair market value of the
actual benefit of the real property to the estate. This required the court
to analyze the value of payments and the actual extent of the debtor's
use.
20
For example, if the contract provided for monthly rent of $1,000 a
month, but the fair market rental of the property was $500 a month,
then $500 was the most the landlord could recover, regardless of the
contract rate. If the debtor only used ten percent of the premises, then
the lessor was entitled to receive ten percent of the fair market value,
or $50 per month. If the debtor only used the property for a portion of
the time, the amount could be reduced by the number of days of actual
use, and if the debtor did not use the property at all, the landlord's
claim could be nothing.
With the adoption of section 365(d)(3), this procedure changed,
though not as effectively as Congress apparently intended.2 Theoreti-
cally, the trustee is now to pay the rent pending assumption or rejec-
tion, but the landlord often still has to seek the assistance of the court
to compel the trustee to pay the rent. At this point, the trustee invaria-
bly claims the landlord is entitled to fair market value rather than the
contract rate, to be reduced by the percentage of the debtor's actual,
beneficial use of the property. 2
As a result of these defenses to claims, the courts have faced the
question of whether the adoption of section 365(d)(3) has wrought any
change in this standard once the lease has been rejected, or whether
they may still reduce the contract rate as appropriate under the
circumstances.
Initially, courts took a simplistic and straight-forward view of the
statute, which says the trustee must perform all the debtor's obligations
under the lease. Because one of the debtor's obligations was to pay rent
at a specified rate, the language of the statute required the contract
rate.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio was ap-
parently the first to address this issue in a reported case,a the case of
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see generally Banks, Note, supra note 13.
21. See Statements of Senator Hatch supra text accompanying note 17. The cases discussed
in this article, particularly at notes 24 to 63, indicate that in a substantial number of reported
cases the trustee has not made payments in accordance with Section 365(d)(3).
22. See cases cited infra notes 23 to 36 and accompanying text.
23. The case of In re Barrister of Delaware, Ltd., infra note 26, was reported prior to
Fisher, but the opinion was actually rendered a few weeks after Fisher.
[Vol. 14:491
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In re Fisher and Fisher, Inc.24 The landlord sought payment of an ad-
ministrative claim for several months of rent due after bankruptcy was
filed. The court found the lease was automatically rejected under sec-
tion 365(d)(4), and, concerning the rent accruing during the first two
months after bankruptcy, held, "We are precluded from questioning
the reasonableness of the monthly rental under the Rental Agreement
for those two months because of an amendment to the bankruptcy stat-
ute effected by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984 at II U.S.C. Section 365(d)(3). ' 25
In the case of In re Barrister of Delaware, Ltd.,26 decided less
than a month after Fisher, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court reached
the same conclusion. In deciding a landlord's claim for administrative
rent accruing between the filing date and the rejection date, the court
held, "The debtor had the obligation under the lease to pay rent. After
entry of the order for relief the trustee must perform that obligation
since no subsection under Section 365 excepts it .... Under the recited
facts, [the landlord] is immediately entitled to the amount claimed."2 7
Specifically quoting the statutory language and legislative history,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Wisconsin agreed,
and in In re Longua,28 held:
The trustee's obligation to pay full rent due during the sixty-day
period for assumption or rejection constitutes an administrative ex-
pense which is payable without notice or hearing. Any necessity for
showing the reasonableness of the rent or of any of the other factors
considered under Section 503(b) has been completely abrogated by
Section 365(d)(3)."
Other courts uniformly adopted and followed this reasoning3" until
24. 51 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
25. Id. at 682-83.
26. 49 B.R. 446 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985).
27. Id. at 447.
28. 58 B.R. 503 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986).
29. Id. at 505.
30. In re Industrial Distribution Servs., Inc., 86 B.R. 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re
Granada, Inc., 88 B.R. 369 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988); In re Homeowner's Outlet Mall Exch., Inc.,
89 B.R. 965 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988); In re
Damianopoulos, 93 B.R. 3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988); In re TDC Dev. Corp., 73 B.R. 135 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Dieckhaus Stationers of King of Prussia, Inc., 73 B.R. 969 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987); In re O.P. Held, Inc., 77 B.R. 388 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987); In re National Oil Co., 80
B.R. 525 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); Daugherty v. Kenerco Leasing, Inc. (Matter of Swanton Corp.),
58 B.R. 474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re M.H.T., Inc., 69 B.R. 69 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986); In re
Coastal Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 62 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Feld v. S & F Conces-
19921
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the question came before the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel in Great Western Savings Bank v. Orvco, Inc. (In re Orvco,
Inc.). 31 The Appellate Panel, noting section 365(d)(3) does not specifi-
cally provide any remedy for violation of its terms, rejected prior deci-
sions and held:
Under this section, a bankruptcy court has the discretion to order the
immediate surrender of the leased premises if a debtor fails to make
the required payments. However, once a lease is deemed rejected, the
language of the section does not attempt the administrative claim sta-
tus of the rent obligation. Nothing in the language of the section re-
quires administrative or, worse yet, super-administrative status. In our
view, the language of 365(d)(3), "notwithstanding section 503(b)(I),"
means that notwithstanding the administrative or non-administrative
status of a claim by a lessor, a bankruptcy court must order its pay-
ment pending assumption or rejection. It does not mean that the ne-
cessity for showing the reasonableness of the rent or any of the other
factors considered under Section 503(b)(1)(A) has been completely
abrogated. Accordingly, we hold that when a lease is deemed rejected,
a lessor must establish its claim for administrative status under Sec-
tion 503(b)(1)(A), the specific section governing such status.32
Since the Orvco decision, there have been several other courts
which have addressed the issue, and the majority of these have contin-
ued to follow the rule laid down in Fisher, expressly rejecting the Ap-
pellate Panel's ruling in Orvco.3 3 The most outspoken of these is the
sion, Inc. (In re S & F Concession, Inc.), 55 B.R. 689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
31. 95 B.R. 724 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989).
32. Id. at 727-28.
33. The following post-Orvco cases either adopt or approve the Fisher rule: In re Worths
Stores Corp., 135 B.R. 112 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991); In re Laurence R. Smith, Inc., 127 B.R. 715
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); In re Lunn, 129 B.R. 477 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); Second Pennsylva-
nia Real Estate Corp. v. Papercraft Corp. (In re Papercraft Corp.), 126 B.R. 926 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1991); In re Safe-T-Brake, Inc., 127 B.R. 68 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991; In re Cardian Mortgage
Corp., 127 B.R. 14 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991). In re Dutch Inns of Am., Inc., 124 B.R. I (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1991); In re Washington Bancorporation, 125 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991); In re
Wingspread Corp., 116 B.R. 915 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re ABC Books and Sch. Supplies,
121 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Meritbanc Sav. Ass'n v. Regency Chevrolet, Inc. (In re
Regency Chevrolet, Inc.), 122 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990); In re Virginia Packaging Supply
Co., 122 B.R. 491 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Western Monetary Consultants, 100 B.R. 545
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 738 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re
U.S. Fax, Inc., 114 B.R. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
The following cases adopt the Orvco reasoning: In re Daisy/Cadnetix, Inc., 126 B.R. 87
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1990). In re Tammey Jewels, Inc., 116 B.R. 292 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In
re Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 118 B.R. 406 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990); In re Bilyk, 101 B.R.
586 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989); In re Patella, 102 B.R. 223 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989).
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Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which, in
the case of In re Wingspread Corporation,3 disputed the Orvco ruling
in detail:
[Liate last year the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in
Orvco . . . held that section 365(d)(3) alone does not automatically
require a debtor to pay the rent reserved in the lease for the 60 days
following the order for relief as an administrative claim, where the
lease is ultimately rejected; Orvco requires that a lessor must establish
its claim for administrative status under Section 503(b)(1)(A). 5
The New York court quoted the Appellate Panel's analysis of the stat-
ute, and disagreed with Orvco's interpretation of the "notwithstanding
section 503(b)(1)" language of section 365(d)(3):
I read "notwithstanding section 503(b)(1)" as meaning that irrespec-
tive of whether the payments required under the lease meet the usual
requirements for administrative status, reasonableness and benefit to
the estate, they are unconditionally due .... By requiring the trustee
to pay "all obligations of the debtor," Congress could not have meant
for the court to look into the reasonableness of the obligations or the
extent to which the debtor utilized the premises during the 60 day
period, for otherwise Congress would not have said all obligations.
The Orvco reading would flout the intent of Congress in that the
landlord would still be forced to provide current services while await-
ing an evidentiary hearing to determine the actual amount the debtor
owed it. This interpretation would place a burden on the bankruptcy
courts to hear and determine the value of the debtor's use of the
premises within 60 days after the petition was filed, irrespective of
when the landlord's motion was brought, because the court cannot ex-
tend the time for such a payment beyond the 60 day period. Section
365(d)(3). The only other alternative would be to construe the statute
to require the trustee to pay the obligations during the 60 day period
and sue later to recover any claimed overpayments, an awkward pro-
cedure which cannot have been envisioned. Accordingly, in agreement
with pre-Orvco decisions, I believe that during the 60 days after an
order for relief is entered or within such extensions as are granted by
the court prior to assumption or rejection, the debtor must pay the
rent reserved under the lease. 36
34. 116 B.R. 915 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
35. Id. at 925.
36. Id. at 926.
1992]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
With these differing views in mind, the question becomes which
more closely follows the language of the statute and the intent of
Congress.
2. The Legislative Purpose
The stated purpose for the adoption of section 365(d)(3) is to pro-
tect lessors who are precluded from access to or use of their property
and continue to incur losses postpetition while the trustee decides
whether to reject or assume the lease. As stated in the Congressional
Record, "This timely performance requirement will insure that debtor-
tenants pay their rent, common area, and other charges on time pend-
ing the trustee's assumption or rejection of the lease."",
The majority rule represented in Fisher and subsequent cases
more correctly addresses this legislative purpose and promotes its in-
tended effect. Under the Orvco holding, a landlord who seeks an ad-
ministrative claim after rejection of the lease is in no better shape after
the adoption of this provision than before. A landlord who does not
take immediate action to compel payment prior to rejection is at a dis-
advantage which the Orvco court apparently felt was justified, perhaps
as a sanction for not taking quicker action. 38 The obvious result of such
an interpretation is to encourage trustees to simply disobey the statute,
make the landlord do the work and incur the expense, and then argue
to reduce the rent down to, in some cases, near nothing.
Recognizing this negative incentive, the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia in the case of In re Washington Bancorporation,s'
following the rule set down in Fisher, has stated:
To rule otherwise would give the trustee, even one with cash al-
ready on hand, an incentive during the first 60 days of the case not to
comply with the prompt payment mandate of § 365(d)(3) if there is a
chance the lease will be rejected and may be at an above-market rent
or if the debtor has not fully occupied the premises. The statute ought
not be interpreted in a fashion that will encourage frustration of the
congressional intent that landlords be paid on a current basis pending
37. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
38. The Ninth Circuit Appellate Panel in Orvco did not openly express any intention to
punish the landlord, but at least one court has indicated a belief that the landlord's failure to take
appropriate action within the 60-day grace period is sufficient justification to limit the landlord's
relief. See In re Food City, Inc., 95 B.R. 451, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). For a discussion of
the relative value of such a remedy to a landlord, see infra subheading C. Possible Remedies.
39. 125 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991).
[Vol. 14:491
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a determination to assume or reject."'
There is no reason to suspect Congress intended to require such
payment only for those landlords fortunate enough to receive it or dili-
gent enough to compel it before rejection. The statute and the record
reflect an intention to require the trustee to pay the rent fully. Accord-
ingly, the legislative intent is promoted more effectively by the majority
rule of Fisher and subsequent cases. The Orvco reasoning would en-
courage frustration of the legislative purpose.
3. The Statutory Language
The statute itself in a fairly direct manner says what the trustee is
supposed to do prior to assumption or rejection of the lease.4 However,
because it gives no specific remedy for violation of its provisions, it does
not strictly address the question of the status of the claim once the
lease is rejected. If the statute is read without regard to its purpose, the
trustee's obligations and the lessor's administrative claim rights after
rejection are less certain. When read in conjunction with the legislative
record, the meaning and purpose of the statute are more discernable.
The statute says the trustee has this obligation prior to rejection of
the lease,42 so one might argue the obligation terminates upon rejec-
tion. There is nothing in the statute, however, which eliminates the ob-
ligation for full, timely performance after rejection of the lease, al-
though the language does appear to limit the creation or duration of
such a liability to the period before rejection. The statute, which cre-
ates an obligation that arises during the grace period and continues
until released or performed, supports the majority view that the con-
tract rate controls the amount of rent due even after rejection of the
lease.
4. Conclusion
The congressional record indicates the majority rule most effec-
tively promotes the intent of Congress and the language of the statute.
The trustee must pay the contract rate on an administrative claim for
rents accruing after bankruptcy is filed and before the lease is rejected.
40. Id. at 329.
41. See the full text of II U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) supra note 18.
42. The specific language says "Itlhe trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the
debtor . . . until such lease is assumed or rejected." See supra note 18.
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B. When is the Administrative Claim to be Paid?
1. Judicial Interpretations-Unconditional, Immediate Payment
vs. Preferential, Pro Rata Treatment
It is virtually undisputed that a landlord who seeks payment of
such a claim is entitled to immediate payment without notice or hear-
ing unless an objection is filed. 43 Payment will be ordered unless some-
one objects, which the trustee invariably does if any substantial amount
of money is involved. When he objects, the issue of when the claim is to
be paid must be decided.
This second question has powerful connotations because, in bank-
ruptcy, priority in payment often is the difference in determining who
will be paid. A claimant who can get earlier payment has a much bet-
ter chance of recovering the full claim, because the pool of distributees
is reduced."
Some courts ordered immediate payment without specifically de-
ciding whether it was required. 46 The first court to actually decide this
question was the District Court of Massachusetts in the case of In re
Rare Coin Galleries of America, Inc.,46 which held, "Section 365(d)(3)
thus gives a special administrative claim priority to post-petition rent
due under a non-residential lease." '47 The court required the trustee to
immediately pay rent accruing during the sixty day post-petition
period.48
The Hawaii Bankruptcy Court relied upon Rare Coin Galleries in
the case of In re Gillis,4" holding:
43. Longua, 58 B.R. at 505; Granada, 88 B.R. at 371; Homeowners, 89 B.R. at 969; West-
ern Monetary Consultants, 100 B.R. at 547; Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. at 740; ABC Books, 121
B.R. at 329. Of course, the same can be said of any request for payment of an administrative
claim, unless the court decides sua sponte to address the merits of the request, which is unlikely. If
no one objects, there is no real issue for dispute and, although the court may schedule a hearing,
any such uncontested request will probably be granted.
44. "In many bankruptcy cases, when a claim is paid makes the difference as to whether it
will be paid at all." In re Virginia Packaging Supply Co., 122 B.R. at 495. Under II U.S.C. §
507(a)(1) (1988), administrative expenses are accorded first priority, but there is still a question
of who gets what when there is not enough money to cover administrative claims. If there are
insufficient funds to pay all administrative claims, then, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, claims are paid
pro rata under § 726(a)(1) and (b). Under other chapters of the Code, payment can vary depend-
ing upon the terms of the confirmed plan, but it normally will also be pro rata.
45. Barrister of Delaware, 49 B.R. at 447, Longua, 58 B.R. at 506.
46. 72 B.R. 415 (D. Mass. 1987).
47. Id. at 416.
48. Id.
49. 92 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988).
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The legislative history of §§ 365(d)(3) and (4) specifically singles
out the nonresidential lessor as deserving of special treatment ....
While the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a specific remedy for the
trustee's failure to comply with the provisions of Section 365(d)(3),
this legislative history distinguishes the nonresidential lessor from all
other creditors. 50
These decisions are based on the conclusion that Congress, in
adopting the provisions of section 365(d)(3), intended to grant special
status to lessors of nonresidential real property. Since the statute itself
requires timely performance of all such lease obligations, including the
payment of rent, these courts held the commercial property lessor has a
special priority status over other administrative claimants, requiring the
claim to be paid fully and immediately.
Several other courts have reconsidered this issue, however, and the
majority of them have not agreed with the ruling in Rare Coin
Galleries.51
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
the case of In re Dieckhaus Stationers of King of Prussia, Inc.,52 de-
cided less than two months after Rare Coin Galleries, took a different
view. The landlord in that case had suggested its claim deserved
"superpriority" status under 11 U.S.C. § 364. 5' The court recognized a
"strong expression of legislative intent" that such rental obligations be
paid on time, pending assumption or rejection of the lease, and held the
landlord's claim "should be paid immediately unless the trustee estab-
lishes good cause for withholding payment.154 The court denied the
landlord any "superpriority status," however, and held:
I conclude that the landlord's section 365(d)(3) administrative ex-
pense claim is not entitled to superpriority status; rather, it is entitled
to payment pro rata with all other allowed chapter 11 administrative
expense claims. Therefore, my order directing immediate payment of
the landlord's claim will be subject to the trustee's right to seek recov-
ery of all or part of the payment in the event all other administrative
50. Id. at 470.
51. See cases cited infra notes 52 to 63 and accompanying text.
52. 73 B.R. 969 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
53. Id. at 973. Section 364 gives the court authority to accord so-called "superpriority"
status to certain unsecured administrative claimants in situations where the trustee cannot other-
wise obtain needed unsecured credit. Such claims have priority over other administrative claim-
ants under section 364(c)(1).
54. Dieckhaus, 73 B.R. at 973.
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expense claimants are not paid in full. 55
The court recognized a nonresidential lessor was similar to an un-
secured creditor extending unsecured credit under section 503(b). Still,
the court noted the Code contained no specific remedy for the trustee's
failure to comply with section 365(d)(3) and held it "inappropriate to
imply the existence of an automatic superpriority status. ' 56
Subsequent decisions relying upon the Dieckhaus rule have fol-
lowed the rationale that the court has always had the discretion to or-
der when an administrative claim should be paid, and section 365(d)(3)
should not be held to change this rule absent a clear expression of con-
gressional intent.
Accordingly, the reasoning of Dieckhaus, which has become the
majority rule, 58 is that lessors of nonresidential real property are, sub-
sequent to rejection of the lease, entitled to an administrative claim
equal in priority to other administrative claims, but which should be
paid immediately upon request unless the trustee establishes good cause
for withholding payment. If it is subsequently determined there are in-
sufficient funds to pay all administrative claims, the trustee will have a
claim against the landlord to recover any amount over and above the
landlord's pro rata share.
There are some other cases which have not disputed the majority
view set forth in Dieckhaus, but have limited their holdings more nar-
rowly. The Nevada Bankruptcy Court in the case of In re United West,
Inc. 59 held the timing of payment of such an administrative claim was
within the discretion of the bankruptcy court. The Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Ohio has twice held such payments may be
subject to recovery if other claimants are not paid in full, but has not
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. In re Washington Bancorporation, 126 B.R. 130 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991). Great Western
Say. Bank v. Orvco, Inc. (In re Orvco, Inc.), 95 B.R. 724 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re Buyer's
Club Mkts., Inc., 115 B. R. 700 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Far West Corp. of Shasta County,
120 B.R. 551 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990); In re Granada, Inc., 88 B.R. 369 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988);
In re Homeowner's Outlet Mall Exch., Inc., 89 B.R. 965 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada has stated, "Section 365 does not ... alter
the longstanding rule that the court has broad discretion over the timing of payment of adminis-
trative claims." In re United West, Inc., 87 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988).
58. Rare Coin Galleries, supra note 46, and Gillis, supra note 49, appear to be the only
courts which have directly addressed the question and held unconditional immediate payment is
mandated.
59. 87 B.R. 138 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1988).
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discussed the issue in detail. See In re Cardinal Industries, Inc.60 and
In re ABC Books and School Supplies.1
The Eastern District of Virginia took a different and somewhat
odd position in the case of In re Virginia Packaging Supply Com-
pany,62 appearing to hold the landlord has the burden of proving the
administrative claims will be paid in full, as opposed to placing the
burden on the trustee to establish good cause to withhold payment,
which is the majority Dieckhaus rule.6 s
With these holdings in mind, the analysis again turns to which of
these rules best reflects the intent of Congress and adherence to the
language of the statute.
2. The Congressional Intent
The apparent purpose of these provisions is to provide lessors of
nonresidential real property timely payment of rent. 64 By the time the
issue at hand arises, this purpose has already been partially circum-
vented because payment is late. Obviously, requiring timely payment
during the initial sixty days accords a nonresidential real property les-
sor some sort of special treatment, so there is little question Congress
intended to prefer these claims over others. However, once rejection has
occurred and the lessor has his property back, the question is whether
Congress intended the lessor to still receive prompt payment of the
claim, with priority over other administrative claimants.
Once again, the legislative record indicates that would be the goal
of the statute. Most courts addressing this issue recognize Congress in-
tended some special treatment for such claims, and require the trustee
to pay the rent unless he can establish good cause not to pay. 5 There is
no question a landlord is going to be preferred if the trustee obeys sec-
tion 365(d)(3) and timely pays the rent, so if the statute is followed,
there is special treatment of such a landlord.
It should be no different when a trustee elects not to comply with
the statute, for to hold otherwise encourages the trustee to disobey the
law, hold the money, and make the lessor come after it. There would be
no incentive to adhere to the statute because, in case of an anticipated
60. 109 B.R. 738 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
61. 121 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
62. 122 B.R. 491, 495 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
63. Id. at 495, Dieckhaus, 73 B.R. at 973.
64. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
65. See Dieckhaus and other cases following its decision, cited supra notes 52 to 57.
1992]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
rejection, the trustee would have very good reasons to disregard it,
thereby creating an excuse to disobey the obligations created by the
1984 Amendments.' 6
Congress intended to grant such a claimant some level of priority
status over other administrative claimants. The holding in Rare Coin
Galleries accords the claimant a clear, unconditional, and immediate
priority, while the holding in Dieckhaus and the majority of cases ac-
cords the claimant some priority subject to the trustee's right to subse-
quently recover some or all of the payment. The stated intent of Con-
gress was to have the landlord paid on time, but the majority view may
discourage compliance and defeat that intention. It appears the minor-
ity view best represents the intent of Congress on this issue.
3. The Statutory Language
The provision itself gives little direction on what sort of priority
such a claim should have once the landlord establishes a claim. The
statute requires timely payment of these obligations, but is silent on
what remedies are available in case of the trustee's failure to adhere to
the requirements.6 7
There is no good reason to require timely payment prior to rejec-
tion and then hold a trustee who disobeys the statute absolved of any
duty for timely or immediate payment after rejection, or to accord the
trustee greater recovery rights against the claimant by virtue of the
trustee's disobedience to the Code. Under the language of the statute,
the obligation for timely payment perhaps cannot be created after re-
jection of the lease, but neither is the obligation which arose prior to
rejection dissipated. The statute does not terminate the obligation for
timely payment simply because of the rejection of the lease or the trus-
tee's failure to comply.
The end result under Dieckhaus is that a trustee who obeys the
statute has to pay the contract rate on time, with no chance of future
recovery. If he disobeys the statute, he may be able to put off payment
of the administrative claim and reduce it pro rata. Under the majority
rule, the trustee is practically always better off disobeying the statute.
66. See statements of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia in the case of In
re Washington Bancorporation, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67. See the text of the statute, supra note 18.
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4. Conclusion
The majority rule acknowledges a lessor of nonresidential real
property is entitled to priority payment, and requires immediate pay-
ment absent a showing of good cause to withhold payment, but allows
the trustee to come back and recover some or all of the payment to
achieve an equal pro rata distribution among administrative claims.
Since the statute was written to give specific, special protection to such
claimants, the majority rule may defeat that purpose.
C. Possible Remedies
There are two basic solutions to resolve these inconsistencies
among the jurisdictions: (1) The courts can continue to address these
questions, dispute them, and render diverse opinions until a clear ma-
jority of appellate courts adopt and follow established rules on which
the parties can reasonably rely, or (2) Congress can amend the statute
to clarify the status and enforcement procedure of the landlord's claim
for rent after rejection of the lease. If Congress intended the contract
rate to control after rejection of the lease, and also intended immediate
payment upon determination of administrative claim status, this should
be spelled out clearly in the statute. Until it is, courts will naturally
continue to resist according a preferred claim status to this particular
class of claimants, even in the face of a congressional intention to do
just that. 8
The second solution is obviously the better but, as with any legisla-
tive enactment, will surely create other questions for litigation. The
provision as it stands leaves many unanswered questions and inspires so
68. Firm evidence of this reluctance exists in the fact that all of the courts addressing this
issue, regardless of the form of proceeding in which the claim is made, decide the claim under
some sort of modified administrative claim analysis. Actually, section 365(d) says nothing about
administrative claim status but requires "timely" performance of the debtor's lease obligations. I I
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) states, "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Bankruptcy Rule 9013 says, "[a]
request for an order, except when an application is authorized by these rules, shall be by written
motion, unless made during a hearing." It appears these statutes and this rule should be enough to
set forth the authority and procedure under which a landlord may obtain the relief mandated in
section 365(d)(3). The legislative history and the statutory language indicate rather clearly this
type of claim is entitled to special treatment separate from the treatment accorded administrative
claims under section 503. Regardless, the courts apparently feel compelled to analyze section
365(d) in relation to its effects on the previous rules under section 503 regarding administrative
rent claims. This may be an example of the courts' resistance to accord some new, special status to
one particular class of claimants, even when the statute and congressional record indicate this was
the intention of Congress.
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much disparity among the jurisdictions that it requires clarification. As
it stands, the intent of Congress may in many cases be defeated.
D. Alternatives for the Landlord
The landlord also really has two options: (1) he can seek immedi-
ate payment for the administrative claim pursuant to the terms of the
contract, or (2) he can attempt to obtain payment or eviction prior to
rejection of the lease. If he pursues payment of an administrative
claim, he will have to litigate the issues described in this article and,
unless he is in one of the cited jurisdictions, he really will not know how
he will fare in court.
If he wishes to avoid a dispute on the amount of the claim and the
time of payment, he will need to take prompt action to compel payment
prior to the expiration of the rejection period. This will be difficult for a
number of reasons. For one thing, a landlord usually will not even know
his tenant is in bankruptcy for a substantial period of time, until he
receives notice from either the court, the trustee, or the debtor. If the
debtor is current on rent and files bankruptcy shortly after a timely
payment, then the landlord may go more than thirty days before he
even suspects something is amiss, because it will be that long before
there is a default in payment.
Regardless of when the landlord finds out about the problem, his
first natural reaction would be to think the trustee will obey section
365(d)(3) and the landlord will get his rent. If he tries to discuss this
matter with the trustee, he may learn the trustee's intentions and he
may not, but he will likely be strung along for some period of time that
will extend past the rejection period.
As soon as he suspects a tenant is in bankruptcy, the landlord's
best remedy is to demand instant payment pursuant to the terms of the
lease, and if it is not soon paid, to promptly institute a proceeding to
compel immediate payment or for relief from stay to evict the debtor.
If the landlord can get a hearing set, and actually procure an order for
payment prior to rejection of the lease, his only problem will be getting
the trustee to obey it. The trustee, upon notice of such a proceeding,
may immediately request the court to reject the lease and obtain such
an order at the same time or perhaps before the landlord's order for
rent, so the landlord will still be relegated to litigating these other ques-
tions because his claim will be determined after rejection.
In many cases, the option of obtaining relief from stay to evict the
debtor is really no option atall and renders section 365(d)(3) practi-
[Vol. 14:491
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
cally meaningless as far as according the landlord any new rights. As-
suming the landlord promptly learns of the bankruptcy, and assuming
he immediately seeks relief from the court to obtain payment or relief
from stay, and assuming the court grants that relief, then the landlord
still has to evict the debtor through a state court proceeding which may
take a great deal of time, long past the rejection of the lease, and he
still has to go through all the procedures described to obtain payment.
Also, if the trustee does not intend to assume the lease, then he often
will not care whether relief from stay is obtained or not, so there is no
real pressure to resist or move. It will be a rare case where a landlord is
able to obtain all this relief and actually recover the rent due under the
lease and section 365(d)(3).
Accordingly, the landlord's best remedy outside of seeking instant
payment of an administrative claim is to promptly obtain an order from
the court requiring the trustee to immediately pay the contract rate on
the lease before rejection.6 9 If he is able to do this, he can avoid the
controversies that have forestalled the landlord's effective use of section
365(d)(3) to get payment for the use of his property. Otherwise, he is
left to litigate his claim entitlements under the authorities discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Congressional Record and the language of the Bankruptcy
Code indicate a lessor of nonresidential real property should, after re-
jection of his lease in a bankruptcy proceeding, immediately recover
from the estate the full, contract amount of rent accruing between the
petition date and the date of rejection. However, the courts are divided
on these issues and have in many cases circumvented this intention.
Though majority opinions are emerging on each question, Congress
should supplement these provisions to more clearly define its intentions
regarding a lessor's rights to post-petition, prerejection rental payments
under a lease of nonresidential real property. Until Congress does so,
the courts will continue to be divided and the congressional intent will
be frustrated.
69. At least one court has ordered such a payment, but in a situation where the lease was
not yet rejected. In re Musikahn Corp., 57 B.R. 942 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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